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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOL. VI MAY, 1932 No. 2
THE WORLD COURT AND THE ANSCHLUSSL W rises to its loftiest heights when it aspires to become
the substitute for war between nations. Within the realm
of a single nation, jurisprudence has made great strides. In
America, it is familiar history how thirteen colonies, each
with a tradition and pride of its own, have been welded
together into a great empire by the aid of a court. It did not
matter that the wisdom of its decisions was often challenged,
that resentment often led to threatened and obstinate rejec-
tion of its decrees. In the end, all have bowed down and lived
by the judicial fiat until today the Supreme Court of the
United States wields a power that many absolute monarchs
might have envied, for its decisions are not only controlling
but they constitute the national concept of justice.
There are those who hope that in time the Permanent
Court of International Justice will become the Supreme
Court of the nations, that through its wise decisions the
peoples of the earth will be welded together into a peaceful
world-community between whom war will be as unthinkable
as it is between the States of the United States.' Judicial
'See, for example, Hugh H. L. Bellott, in the GRoTlus SocIETY PUBLICA-
TIONs No. 8, p. 19 (1921): "This great achievement and I trust this brief
survey of the history and functions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the instrument of that achievement, will have impressed upon your mind the
fact that, faced with the problem of establishing a permanent court of inter-
national justice, we are not limited to a priori speculations, but have at our
service the rich experience of great nations, organized on a federal system of
divided sovereignty and the inheritor of English legal traditions." See also an
address by Professor Manley 0. Hudson before the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, delivered Dec. 29, 1923, in NATIONAL LAW PAMPHLET,
Vol. 33, No. 5, at p. 28: "I hope that Mr. Borchard and I are going to
look back upon a time when decisions of this court will so greatly have changed
the minds of us all, will so greatly have contributed to the creation of that
'will to peace' which both he and I want, that we can say it was a great work
that was being done, a great contribution that was being made to the develop-
ment and administration of international law."
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wisdom of a high order will be required to accomplish so vast
an undertaking, and just as the Supreme Court was met with
criticism, not only by defeated suitors but also by partisans
who saw in its decisions ruin of their favorite policies, so the
World Court will encounter like hostility and, no doubt, even
greater obstruction, for the World Court does not have con-
venient to hand a friendly executive and legislature to help
it to enforce its decrees. Even greater, therefore, is the neces-
sity for that high judicial statesmanship which is the marrow
of all public law.
It is, therefore, of greatest importance to examine with
care the decision of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Austro-German Customs Union case, its first
cause celebre, for it there had before it an issue which, at
other times, might have led to serious difficulty between the
nations yet the calm way .in which the decision of the Court
was accepted has given renewed hope for the future destiny
of that great tribunal.2
On the 19th of March, 1931, the sovereign states of
Germany and Austria entered into a treaty or protocol. The
form of this treaty is familiar in international relations. It
was a Customs Union.3 By its terms, both countries agreed
to put into effect simultaneously, in their respective realms,
a like tariff law, to be agreed upon between them. There was
to be free trade between the two countries and the revenues
derived from the agreed tariff were to be divided between
the two countries according to a fixed quota. There were
certain necessary administrative provisions, and it was pro-
2 "It must be admitted, however, that this almost equal division of the
World Court, when asked to interpret a treaty, does not heighten its prestige.
Apparently, political questions, although the World Court specifically renounces
any right or intention to deal with them, got mixed up with the legal question.
* * * But Americans have to remember that their own Supreme Court is often
divided, when handing down decisions by 5 to 4. That does not impair its
authority or lead anyone to question its indispensable place in our system of
government. The hope is, of course, that the World Court will work out for
itself a similar recognition as the ultimate arbiter in all international disputes
that are justiciable."-From the N. Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1931, p. 12:1. "The
important fact is that a really dangerous political crisis was avoided because
the Court was in existence and because the nations of Europe had sufficient
confidence in it to turn to it in a grave emergency."-Quoted from a speech by
Nicholas Murray Butler in the N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1931, p. 20:2.
'The text of the protocol is set forth as an appendix to the opinion of the
Court. See PUBLICATIONS OF THE WORLD COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
Series A/B, No. 41, p. 99 (1931).
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vided that the protocol might be denounced at any time
after three years from its date, upon one year's notice by
either party to it.
France, Italy and Czecho-Slovakia challenged the proto-
col on the ground that Austria had violated its solemn inter-
national obligations by entering into it. It was claimed that
it constituted, if not an immediate alienation of Austrian
independence, at least a step in that direction and, as such, it
was prohibited by the express provisions of the treaty of
Saint-Germain and of the treaty of October 4, 1922. In both
documents, Austria had undertaken to preserve its indepen-
dence and to avoid all conduct which might compromise its
independence.4
Time and place affect everything. Thus it would prob-
ably not be claimed that such a treaty between Austria and
England and the United States was at all dangerous to the
independence of Austria. There is nothing in a Customs
Union as such to bring disquietude to the nations. Such
treaties have a long and respected history. But the location
of the two countries, their common traditions, their recent
alliance and the consanguinity of their peoples led to the
anxieties that were manifested by some of the neighboring
powers.
Particularly uneasy was the Government of France. In
a memorandum which it circulated among the nations, it
expressed its attitude as follows: 5
"International public opinion cannot understand
why these negotiations should have been carried on in
secret, if-as those who took part in them declare-
their purpose was in strict conformity with the inter-
national obligations of the contracting parties and
with the principles of the League of Nations and the
European Union. Public opinion has gained the dis-
agreeable impression that an attempt has been made
to confront it with an accomplished fact. This impres-
sion was only partially removed when the German
'For text of the relevant portions of the treaties involved, id. at pp.
42, 43, 44.
'PUBLICATIONS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
Series C, No. 53, p. 630 (1931).
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and Austrian Governments publicly announced their
intention to accept the procedure of the Council of
the League of Nations. The French Government
noted this welcome declaration with the greatest sat-
isfaction."
In the same memorandum, the view is expressed that
not only was the Regime Douanier violative of the legal
obligations of Austria but that it was also inimical to the
economic and political interests of Europe.0
"In the present memorandum the French Govern-
ment will, first of all, state its own view of the legal
aspect of the problem which is before the Council;
attention will then be directed to the consequences
which the carrying out of the intentions announced in
the protocol of March 19th may have from the eco-
nomic point of view, particularly as regards Austria,
and to their political consequences; and, lastly, it will
be considered whether the spirit or the methods which
presided over the elaboration of this protocol are in-
spired by the ideas underlying the investigations un-
dertaken for the realization of European union and
by the principles on which the Covenant of the League
of Nations is based."
With such a formidable attack before it, the Council of
the League of Nations met on the 18th and 19th of May,
1931, to consider the problem and to decide on a course of
conduct. 7 Mr. Henderson spoke first. In his opin*ion,8 "the
issue raises important economic and even political questions;
but the aspect of the case with which we as a Council are
concerned this morning is essentially one of juridical nature
and it is therefore eminently one on which it would be desir-
able for the Council to request an advisory opinion from the
Permanent Court of International Justice. To follow any
other course would mean protracted discussion in this Coun-
Ibid. at p. 613.
Ibid. at pp. 10-40.
8 Ibid. at p. 11.
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cil and, of necessity, a careful examination of the legal instru-
ments bearing upon the issue which has been raised, and, in
the end, a possible failure to reach a conclusion."
All the nations were agreed that this was the proper
course to pursue but trained diplomats do not agree without
more. It was necessary for each plenipotentiary to state his
agreement in fitting language and the views of the various
contestants were thus given at great length. Acrimony was
not wanting.0 "I think that the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice and the Council of the League were set up
precisely in order that no power might allege that there
existed certain political facts which concerned nobody but
itself. We must not forget that the last great war broke out
because one great power asserted that a particular fact con-
cerned only itself, and refused all suggestions of reference
to the Hague Court, of interventions or conferences."
To which the German representative replied,10 "I par-
ticularly regret the fact that M. Marinkovitch justified his
observations on this point by a reference to historical facts
which, to my mind, should be left out of account."
Nor was the discussion devoid of its lighter moments.
Naturally the debate veered to historic precedents and it was
soon discovered that the assembled diplomats had divergent
views even with regard to the truths of history. Then up
spake Mr. Henderson::" "Mr. President, in view of the char-
acter of this discussion, I think it is time I gave notice that I
will ask to be permitted to add a rider to my resolution that
these speeches go to the Court for an advisory opinion as to
which speech is historically accurate."
"I do not wish to prolong this discussion," said Mr.
Hymans, "but you will understand that I feel obliged to say
a few words. I think that 'it is essential, since the Permanent
Court of International Justice is, in Mr. Henderson's pro-
posal, being asked for an advisory opinion as to historical
accuracy."
In due course, the case came before the great tribunal.
Arguments written and oral were considered by the judges
' Ibid. at p. 32.
"Ibid. at p. 33.
U Ibid. at p. 39.
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and in the end, of the fifteen judges who considered the mat-
ter, eight decided against the legality of the customs regime
and seven dissenting judges thought it was perfectly legal.
Americans who are accustomed to five to four decisions
of the Supreme Court have an attitude towards them which
it will be difficult for the uninitiate to understand. Depend-
ing on the view of the critic, he regards one group of judges
as impelled by logic and reason and the other by the force of
inarticulate major premises. This is especially so in the case
of decisions construing the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution. Here the scope of judicial discretion is wide
and the field for constructive statesmanship is wide. It is
inevitable that men should disagree as to policy and that
each should regard his view as made necessary by reason
and logic.
Perhaps in international law the situation is even more
aggravated, for here the problems are essentially political no
matter what else may be said about them. Quarrels do not
arise between nations in the same manner in which disputes
between individuals arise. Nations are almost always im-
pelled to act by political and economic considerations. In
modern times, such considerations predominate in the minds
of statesmen. Hence disputes that lead to reprisals and war
are essentially political and economic and a court which is
established to substitute judicial determination of points of
difference between nations for armed conflict must neces-
sarily, therefore, concern itself with these political and eco-
nomic matters. The Court has been in turn criticized- and
praised for having taken into consideration, in the instant
case, matters strictly political. It has been pointed out that
.the Supreme Court of the United States has avoided this
pitfall,12 yet even the German representative at the Council
was aware of the necessities of the situation.' "I am no
pedant in legal matters: I know that behind legal phrases
and forms there stand the active forces of economic, national
and international life. Hence, to my mind, it is plain that we
"Cf. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 338,
and, also, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation (1925) 39 HAv. L.
REv. 221.
" Supra note 5 at p. 33.
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cannot counter the Vienna Protocol solely from the stand-
point of legal forms. We can, however, confidently leave it
to the judges of The Hague to determine how far they need to
take into account the forces that lie behind the formuloe and
give birth to them."
Before considering the decision of the Court, it will be
interesting to follow the arguments, both written and oral,
which were presented to the judges. Of those who signed the
Treaty of Saint-Germain and the Protocol of 1922, only
France, Italy and Czecho-Slovakia appeared against the Cus-
toms Regime. Austria and Germany defended.
The request for the advisory opinion which was made by
the Council merely required the Court to give its opinion as
to whether an arrangement such as that set forth in the
Protocol of Vienna was compatible with the obligations un-
dertaken by Austria in the Treaty of Saint-Germain and the
Protocol of 1922. Both documents affirm the inalienable
independence of Austria. The treaty also contains the fur-
ther provision that Austria undertakes "to abstain from any
act which might directly or indirectly or by any means what-
ever compromise her independence." And in the proto-
col, Austria undertakes "that it will abstain from any
negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement
calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this inde-
pendence." 14
The precise question, therefore, before the Court was
whether the Customs Regime, as set forth in the Protocol of
1931, was (1) a present alienation of Austrian independence
or (2) an act or engagement directly or indirectly calculated
to compromise that independence. In order to hold that the
Vienna Protocol was created in violation of the obligations
of Austria, it was, therefore, not necessary for the Court to
be of the opinion that the independence of Austria was
thereby effectively injured, it was sufficient for the Court to
come to the conclusion that the protocol was a step in the
direction of the alienation of Austrian independence and that
it put the independence of Austria in danger of being lost,
or at least that it increased the hazard of a political union
" Supra note 4.
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between Austria and Germany. Mr. Justice Holmes has
pointed out with great force that an act which taken by
itself might be entirely innocent and devoid of legal conse-
quences might, nevertheless, constitute a link in a conspiracy
by virtue of which fact the act would become illegal and
void."
The importance of the problem which was thus presented
to the Permanent Court can best be stated in the language of
M. Scialoja, the Italian advocate: 1
"The problem of the political and economic inde-
pendence of Austria is one of the most delicate and
dangerous problems in present-day Europe. It is so
delicate and so dangerous that the treaties of peace
and the acts which followed them have established a
quite exceptional special regime to guarantee that
independence wh.ich is considered as an indispensable
condition to the peace of Europe." (Translation ours.)
This was said in reply to Professor Kaufmann, the Austrian
advocate, who had challenged a prior remark of M. Scialoja,
for apparently the opposition to the Customs Union was not
content to abide by an adverse decision of the Court but had
suggested that even after the decision of the Court political
considerations still remained which might be considered by
the Council of the League.' 7 "If you declare," said M.
Scialoja, "that the Council has nothing to do with it, that
declaration may become tomorrow a declaration of war."
(Translation ours.) It is thus apparent that the problem
which was presented for the Court was not an ordinary case
'Akins v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 205, 25 Sup. Ct. 218, 220 (1904).
"But an act, which in itself is merely a voluntary muscular contraction, derives
all its character from the consequences which will follow it under the circum-
stances in which it was done. When the acts consist of making a combination
calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts, when done
maliciously, cannot be denied because they are to be followed and worked out
by conduct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the acts. No
conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of
which it may be a part. The most innocent and constitutionally protected of
acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a
plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punish-
ment of the plot by law."
" Sitpra note 5 at p. 586.
" Ibid. at p. 478.
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but was a dispute involving considerations of a most serious
nature for the settlement of which war itself was not con-
sidered an unlikely instrument.
A question of such vast importance was necessarily con-
sidered by the Court at great length. Fourteen daily sessions
were occupied by the arguments of counsel and the Court
took a month to decide the case. The first public sitting took
place on July 20, 1931, and the last on August 5, 1931. The
decision of the Court was not rendered until the 5th of Sep-
tember, 1931. The circumstances of the presentation of this
case to the Court recalls the early days of the Supreme Court
of the United States when arguments of counsel consumed
days and briefs were of moderate length. Here, too, the com-
bined written arguments of all the parties occupied only 137
pages of the printed record while the oral arguments spread
over 381 pages. All these are set forth in full .in a publication
of the Permanent Court which is put forth under the unas-
suming title "Series C, No. 53"; a document which may some
day prove to be of great historic importance.
The arguments cover a wide field. There are technical
points taken up entirely with a discussion of the true mean-
ing of the word "independence". It is attempted to show, on
the one hand, that independence and sovereignty are synony-
mous terms; that as long as a nation, through its duly
authorized officials, has the power to determine its internal
affairs, it is independent. On the other hand, it is argued
that independence is lost when a nation puts itself under an
obligation to determine its internal affairs according to a
fixed policy or according to the determinations of another
power. There are endless historical arguments which con-
sider similar customs unions which were entered into by
many lands in many periods of the world's story. There is
reliance upon the authority of judges, jurists and publicists
generally. There are sociological arguments which discuss
the factual situation and attempt to show that the realities
obtaining in Austria and in Germany render this particular
protocol violative of the treaty obligations of Austria no
matter what might be said of the same kind of protocol
between Austria and any other country. There are even
philosophical arguments that discuss the applicability of the
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doctrine of causality, and, indeed, we find reference in one
of the briefs to Immanuel Kant.18
While the German Government rested its case on the
proposition that the Customs Regime was a mere agreement
as to fiscal policies between the two nations involved and
that it in nowise affected the freedom of action of either
nation and could, therefore, not be said to be hostile to their
respective independence, and while the Austrian Government
asserted that the protocol was an act of a free nation and
that to proscribe it was to limit rather than enhance the
independence of the contracting parties, the opposition, on
the other hand, sought to go beyond the words of the texts
before the Court and to read the treaties in the light of
current events.' 9
"It is hardly possible to assert that all Customs
Unions involve a suppression or a limitation of inde-
pendence. In fact, it is not necessary to show in this
connection that all Customs Unions lead necessarily
to such a suppression or limitation. It is therefore
unnecessary to engage in a detailed discussion of all
Customs Unions that have ever existed; it is sufficient
to find analogous cases, that is to say, to present a
certain analogy with the proposed Austro-German
Customs Union and here it is well to note that the
situation which obtains in Austria and Germany re-
calls the situation which existed in Germany in the
nineteenth century. If we examnne the situation which
existed in the third decade of the nineteenth century
in Germany, we will see that the states which were
joined together by means of a Customs Union had
contiguous territory, an identity of language and the
sentiment of a common race (or as expressed by the
German authors, a consciousness of being one people
-einheitliches Volksbewusstein-and a common par-
entage--Blutsverwandtschaft). It is a fact well known
and accepted that during the period in which the first
Customs Unions between Prussia and the other Ger-
'
8 Ibid. at p. 452.
"Ibid. at p. 172.
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man states were concluded, there existed a movement
tending toward political unity that nourished the ideal
of a grand German Empire, firmly established."
(Translation ours.)
The analogy is pressed very closely by M. Pilotti, speak-
ing on behalf of the Government of Italy: 20
"No one doubts their good faith; but the point is
another. The Treaty of Saint-Germain certainly had
in view the maintenance of the political independence
of Austria; that is the very thesis of our opponents.
It had equally in view, we may add, to safeguard that
independence against anything that might directly or
indirectly expose it to danger. Does not the conclu-
sion of this proposed Customs Union weaken by resis-
tance against unification and give added strength to
the economic fusion of the two countries and to those
characteristics which they already had in common.
It would be, in our opinion, to close our eyes to real-
ity, to forget that there exists now for a long time a
strong movement for the political unification of Aus-
tria and Germany, and that that movement can de-
velop only to better advantage if the project of a
Customs Union is effected. All the good will of the
Austrian Government, all the care that it has taken
for the economic needs of its people will perhaps not
impede the progress of the idea of the Anschluss-I
speak only of the idea-and despite this good will and
this care it is none the less true that the Government,
by one of its acts, will give an opportunity for the
development of this idea. That we think is contrary
to the international engagements of Austria." (Trans-
lation ours.)
The Court thus had before it a problem the solution of
which depended upon the application of a juristic principle.
It had to determine whether it would proceed to resolve the
controversy solely upon the record before it and close its eyes
Ibid. at p. 462.
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as a court to what it knew as a body of men; whether it
would stick closely to the texts of the treaties or take into
consideration the political and economic background in
which the treaties were written and in which the interpreta-
tion was to be made. Of necessity, a choice between these two
views had to be made. On this very issue it was that the
Court divided.
M. Anzilotti, in his concurring opinion, points out that
political and economic problems are necessarily involved in
the decision and he also demonstrates the necessity of con-
sidering such problems. 21 "I grant that the Court may refuse
to give an opinion which would compel it to depart from the
essential rules governing its activity as a tribunal (Advisory
Opinion, No. 5, p. 29), but I am unable to admit that the
Court can answer a question other than that which has been
put to it or confine itself to answering a part of that question.
To my mind, that would be an abuse of its powers."
Criticism of the Court has been made because of these
very words.2 2 It has been urged that the Court should not
have taken into consideration political questions. The anal-
ogy to the Supreme Court has been pressed and it has been
suggested that just as the United States Supreme Court has
refused to consider matters political so the World Court
must do likewise. The argument overlooks much that is vital
in the hopes and aspirations that surround the existence of
the first real International Tribunal. Of necessity, matters
which come before the World Court will have political con-
notation. There does not exist, side by side with the Court,
' From the opinion of the Court, supra note 4 at p. 69.
' See a note of Professor Edwin M. Borchard, 25 Am. J. INT. LAw 711,
715 (1931) : "Thus a great court, it is respectfully submitted, converts a legal
into a political question and decides it on considerations involving exclusively
political speculation. * * * The Council of the League has thus used the Court
and the Court has avowedly permitted itself to be used to achieve a political
goal." Cf. reply to the above by Philip C. Jessup, 26 Am. J. INT. LAw 105,
110 (1932) : "It will hardly be denied that the interpretation of treaties is a
judicial function, even if the treaty enjoinment is one against doing acts which
may have certain economic or political consequences." Cf. also Pugh, Austro-
German Custoins Union and World Court Decision (1931) 5 Cix. L. REv. 442,
454, 455: "If the World Court is to be a tribunal limited exclusively in
its opinions to what appears on the face of treaties or protocols submitted to it
for decision or advice, without authority to take into consideration actual
existing circumstances and those likely to come into existence, it is not probable
that it will be of much use in settling controversies between nations. Such
disputes must nearly always involve political considerations and consequences."
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an executive or a legislature upon whose shoulders conten-
tious issues may be thrown. War, as we have said, is the
result in this era of considerations that are largely political
and economic. Its avoidance, therefore, requires the solution
of such problems by an impartial tribunal. If the Permanent
Court of International Justice is to be that tribunal, it must
assume its burden of deciding cases in the full light of the
politics and the economics involved in the problems set
before it. To do anything else is to reduce itself to a non-
entity in world affairs.
The dissenting opinion would seem to indicate that the
judges who concurred in it had a narrow view of the func-
tions of the World Court, that they were ready to base their
decision solely on the record 23 without regard to the realities
surrounding the record. "The decision of the Court must
necessarily be based upon the material submitted for its con-
sideration. Unless the material submitted to and passed upon
by the Court justifies the conclusions reached, these conclu-
sions cannot amount to more than mere speculations." It is
submitted that it would be impossible to include in a record
before the Court some of the criteria for judgment which
necessarily must affect the determination of disputes between
nations. Indeed, the purposes that animated the contracting
parties when they signed the Vienna Protocol might well
have an important bearing upon the problem of whether or
not the agreement constituted a violation of Austria's inter-
national obligation.
The majority of the Court took a broader view of the
case. The prevailing opinion concludes with the following
words: 24
"Finally if the regime projected by the Austro-
German Protocol of Vienna in 1931 be considered as a
whole from the economic standpoint adopted by the
Geneva Protocol of 1922, it is difficult to maintain
that this regime is not calculated to threaten the
economic independence of Austria and that it is, con-
sequently, in accord with the undertakings specifically
Supra note 4 at p. 76.
21 Ibid. at p. 52.
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given by Austria in that protocol with regard to her
independence."
We have seen that the concurring opinion of M. Anzilotti is
based on the same juristic point of view and that only the
dissenting judges would have us believe that the World
Court is foreclosed from considering any matters which are
not specifically in the record before it.
On the merits of the issue, there might have been room
for debate whether it is reasonable to assume that under the
facts as they obtain in Germany and Austria the Customs
Union is a step in the direction of the Anschluss. It is a
matter about which men may differ. It is difficult to declare
out of hand that an affirmation of that proposition is unrea-
sonable. We should not quarrel with the dissenting judges
had they been of the opinion that the economic plight of the
world made the Customs Union reasonable and of slight
effect upon the movement for unification between the con-
tracting nations. If that had been their point of view, they
might have justified themselves on the basis of an argument
which might perhaps be established factually. But to attempt
to sustain the customs regime without regard to the realities
of the case and relying solely upon a verbal interpretation of
the treaty seems to us to fly in the face of all sound jurispru-
dence and to reduce the Court to an ineffective vehicle in
international relations.
A similar problem confronts the Supreme Court of the
United States when it is required to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of legislation. Is a statute within or without the
orbit of due process? Most often, the determination must be
made in the light of social and economic facts which bear
heavily upon the reasonableness of the legislative effort. It
is the refusal of the Court to take such matters into account
that has led to the famous divisions of opinion. Given the
facts, a judgment can be made on the reasonableness of the
conduct. Without the facts, the judgment is a decision in
v'acuo.
Ultimately the importance of this decision by the Per-
manent Court will be found to lie in the fact that it was
made and acquiesced in. The pain of the moment will pass
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but the fact will remain that the Court has determined a
political issue that for a time seemed without solution. Such
was the history of the Supreme Court of the United States.
When Marbury v. Madison 25 was decided, no one knew what
the genius of Marshall had accomplished. Few realized that
by it he had established the superiority of the judiciary over
the legislature, but it was not long before its effect began to
be felt so that now it is a matter of course that statutes must
run the gauntlet of judicial review before their validity can
be attested. So with the World Court. Criticism there will
be and must be. The dissatisfaction of those against whom
the mandate of the Court has run is, of course, keen. But
when the fire has died down, the Court will emerge with a
powerful precedent to guide it in future determinations.
That result is, of course, of far greater importance to the
future of world peace than the rightness or wrongness of the
particular decision. A different judgment must be passed
upon the decision when we consider it from the point of view
of the alignment of the judges.
When we consider the nationality of the various judges
who constitute the prevailing majority and compare it with
the nationality of the judges who constitute the dissent, in-











and among the dissenters:
M. Adatci, Japanese
Mr. Kellogg, American
1 Cranch (U. S.) 137 (1803). See 1 IVARREN, THE SUPREINE COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) 251, 255.
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Baron Rolin-Jacquemys, Belgian




It is passing strange that all the judges on the bench
,representing Latin-American countries followed the lead of
French and Italian judges, as did also the judges represent-
ing Spain and Poland, while in the minority we find only
England, the United States, Holland, Belgium, Japan, China
and Germany. It does-not need much persuasion to recognize
that England and the United States have interests in Ger-
many that are for the moment paramount. The present prob-
lems in Manchuria had not arisen at the time of this decision
and it is plain that most of the political affliations of Japan
and China were with the United States and Great Britain
rather than with France and its allies. Nor does it require
erudition to note that the French and Italian judges have
had the concurrence of the judges of the countries allied to
France in constructing the majority, such as those of Spain
and Poland. Again, the United States is not popular in
Latin-America and the attachment of the Latin-American
countries to Spain, which is in a sense their mother country,
is also not very obscure.
That the first far-reaching decision by the Court should
have lined up the judges on a political basis is much to be
regretted. Popular opinion was not slow to seize upon this
one fact as an element of adverse criticism. But the fact is
of small importance when it is measured with the permanent
good that the decision may ultimately accomplish, for a bit-
terly contentious issue was resolved in this instance by a
judicial process.
Both sides have willingly accepted the judicial fiat and
it, therefore, stands as a beacon light by which future ships
of state may be steered. The future of world peace through
judicial action demands a strong court which will not hesi-
tate to make decisions and settle controversies so that in the
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end we may all come to look upon the Permanent Court as
the mecca of international justice.26
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I Cf. John W. Davis, The World Court Settles the Questiao (Jan.,
1932) ATL. MONTHLY, p. 130: "Even if the correctness of the Court's
deliverance through its majority were more doubtful than I suppose it to be, I
should still think it is a great advance that a question so embroiled bad been
referred to the Court instead of being left to the arbitrament of force as the
rival alternative. It is a welcome sign of progress that great nations were
willing to submit to the Court matters of such vital consequence and reason out
their case before it in open argument and debate. The decision of the World
Court in the Austro-German case will stand in history for what it is--a decision
sound in itself and a milestone on the path to the final reign of law. Whatever
criticism or protest it may have evoked today will soon be of purely antiquarian
interest."
